Specimen No. 0938 · Habitat H5 · Rust

rmcp 3.6.0: the Rust MCP SDK turns a silent hang into an error under the 2026-07-28 spec

rmcp 3.6.0 enforces the 2026-07-28 rule that servers must not send requests to clients, cancels abandoned calls, and bounds the stdio line buffer.

WILDNESS1 / 5 · TAMED
Verified: The rmcp-v3.6.0 release notes, the bodies of PRs #1326, #1344, #1049 and #1367, and crates.io.Only claimed: Nothing beyond the maintainers' own PR descriptions.
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rmcp 3.6.0, the Model Context Protocol project’s official Rust SDK, was published to crates.io on 20 October. It does not add support for the 2026-07-28 spec; rmcp 3.5.1 already treated 2026-07-28 as its latest protocol version. What 3.6.0 does is enforce one of that spec’s rules, and that fixes a bug that failed silently.

The hang that becomes an error

The 2026-07-28 spec says a server “MUST NOT send independent JSON-RPC requests” over streamable HTTP, and “MUST NOT write JSON-RPC requests” over stdio. Sampling, elicitation and roots now go through InputRequiredResult, the multi-round-trip pattern (MRTR), instead of the server calling back into the client.

As PR #1326 explains, rmcp still let a handler call peer.create_message() against a 2026-07-28 client. Over stateless streamable HTTP, the client’s answer came back as a new POST, which the server acknowledged with 202 and dropped. “The handler, the SSE stream, and the client’s call_tool all hung without an error.”

In 3.6.0, Peer<RoleServer> rejects every outbound request (sampling, elicitation, roots, ping and custom requests) once a client has negotiated 2026-07-28 or later. The error is invalid_request and points at InputRequiredResult. The stateless HTTP path now answers a POSTed response with 400.

There is no public API change, but runtime behaviour changes. The PR says this mainly hits setups with rmcp on both ends over stdio, which “already violated the spec” and fail against other spec-following SDKs. Those servers should return InputRequiredResult instead.

Abandoned calls get cancelled

PR #1344 is for agent loops. If a client drops a call_tool, get_prompt or read_resource future, for example on a tokio::time::timeout or a lost select! branch, rmcp now sends a best-effort notifications/cancelled. Before, the server kept working on a request nobody was waiting for.

Hardening

Two transport fixes are worth knowing about. Neither has a security advisory.

  • Bounded stdio lines (#1049). AsyncRwTransport read lines with no ceiling, so “one unterminated line from an untrusted peer is enough to take the process down,” per the PR. That path backs every stdio server on rmcp::transport::io::stdio() and every TokioChildProcess client. The default limit is now 16 MiB; with_max_line_length changes it. An oversized line is dropped and the connection stays open.
  • Redirects (#1367). The default streamable HTTP client follows same-origin 307 and 308 redirects, up to 10 hops, and stops on 301, 302, 303 and anything cross-origin. 301 to 303 would turn a POST into a bodyless GET and lose the message without an error.

The release also adds opt-in initial scope selection for OAuth, a non-blocking stdio_pipes transport, and now ships the LICENSE file in both crates.

Why it matters

The 2026-07-28 spec changed how MCP servers ask clients for help. A port that compiles but hangs on the first sampling call is the worst kind of migration bug. With 3.6.0 it fails loudly instead.

Update, 23 October 2026: two advisories, and 3.7.0

This post said the two transport fixes above had no security advisory. That is still true of them, but 3.6.0 also closed a separate High-severity advisory, published on 20 October, that we missed. GHSA-4432-vg92-fqh6 covers versions 3.0.0 up to 3.6.0: the StreamableHttpService cached tool schemas without a limit, so a client on protocol 2026-07-28 or later could exhaust server memory, without logging in if no auth layer sits in front. If you cannot upgrade, put authentication in front of the server or reject unknown tool names.

A second advisory, GHSA-5p52-q7pq-9fq2, rated Moderate and published 22 October, affects 2.0.0 through 3.6.0, so 3.6.0 is not enough. An earlier fix for server-side request forgery in OAuth discovery checked host names as text, missed bracketed IPv6 addresses and skipped the token and registration endpoints. rmcp 3.7.0, out on 22 October, makes AuthorizationManager::new check every resolved address. Single sign-on on a private host name now needs new_allowing_private_addresses, and clients built with new_with_oauth_http_client still get only the text check. Neither advisory has a CVE number yet.

Update, 5 November 2026: rmcp 3.9.0 adds the Skills extension

rmcp 3.9.0 landed on GitHub and crates.io on 5 November 2026 (crates.io created 16:07 UTC). The release notes highlight:

  • Skills extension (SEP-2640) via PR #1392. Skills are served through the Resources primitive under the io.modelcontextprotocol/skills extension id (skills/list, skills/get). This is an extension, not a core MCP protocol requirement: servers that never declare skills keep working as before.
  • Manifest containment via PR #1412: Skill::validate rejects URIs that escape the skill root, sibling directories, and terminal dot segments, and capability negotiation refuses skills without the matching resources capability.
  • A merge-from-fork commit listed in the release (3e0156c) that tightens body-bound reads on oversized HTTP responses. It is a hardening merge, not a new public advisory.
  • Other fixes named in the notes: protected-resource discovery error structure, redirect logging, ProgressDispatcher lock placement, OAuth refresh scopes, session-worker cancellation, SIGTERM-before-kill on child shutdown, outputSchema generation, discover-session server-to-client request rejection, ID-JAG resource claim handling, Mcp-Param header validation, Accept media-type matching, URL elicitation without elicitationId, and preserving protocol errors across cancellation.

The 5 November release notes listed a merge-from-fork body-bound hardening commit (3e0156c) without naming a new advisory at ship time. A related repo advisory for that class of bug is covered in the 6 November update below. The published advisory list still includes GHSA-5p52-q7pq-9fq2 among earlier issues. Upgrade path from the October advisories remains: get to a fixed line for those issues, then take 3.9.0 for Skills, the listed fixes and the Streamable HTTP body caps.

Update, 6 November 2026: GHSA-c9f9-cp8h-jcj5, Moderate body-buffer DoS in Streamable HTTP clients

The rust-sdk repo published GHSA-c9f9-cp8h-jcj5 on 5 November 2026 (Moderate, CVSS 6.5). Affected versions are >= 0.2.0, < 3.9.0; patched in 3.9.0. The built-in Streamable HTTP clients (reqwest and Unix-socket) read non-streaming response bodies into memory with no size limit, so a malicious or compromised MCP server can exhaust client memory (CWE-400 / CWE-770). The attack works during initialize, before authentication. The SSE path is not affected (events are already capped by max_sse_event_size, default 16 MiB).

The fix caps successful JSON bodies at 16 MiB and non-success / error bodies at 64 KiB, counting bytes while streaming and rejecting oversized Content-Length before the body is read. Custom StreamableHttpClient implementations remain responsible for their own limits. The global GitHub Advisory Database may still 404 for this id; treat it as a repo advisory published on modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk until the global DB catches up. No CVE is listed on the advisory page yet.

If you run an rmcp Streamable HTTP client older than 3.9.0, upgrade. Until then, connect only to trusted MCP servers or use a custom client that enforces a body limit.

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